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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20020590-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 
driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior DUI convictions, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea where the court strictly complied with rule 11 and the prosecutor fulfilled his plea 
agreement to make a favorable sentencing recommendation? 
Standard of Review. "The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings 
of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 14,26 P.3d 
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203. "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(4) 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
* * * 
(4)( A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
• * * 
Utah Code Ann, S 41-6-44(2)(a) & (€)(*) (SUPP. 2000) 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within 
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, 
or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
* * * 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior 
DUI convictions, driving on a suspended license, and driving without registration. R. 1-2. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol 
with two prior DUI convictions and the remaining two charges were dismissed. R. 33-41. In 
accordance with the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended that defendant serve only 
90 days in jail with credit for time served. See R. 107:8-9. The trial court, however, 
followed the recommendation in the presentence investigation report and sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 41; R. 107: 10. 
Following his sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 44-45. 
After new counsel was appointed, defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. R. 53, 56-69. The court denied defendant's motion. R. 98. Defendant immediately 
filed a motion to reconsider, alleging for the first time that the prosecutor had not complied 
with the terms of the plea bargain . R. 83-95. The trial court again denied the motion. 
R. 100-02. Defendant timely appealed. R. 103. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On August 25,2000, defendant and a friend purchased a case of beer at a Blanding 
gas station. R. 106: 4, 8. Some two-and-a-half hours later, defendant returned to the store 
with his friend. R. 106: 8. As he drove into the gas station, defendant overshot his approach 
to the gas pump, driving straight for the pole holding up the canopy. R. 106:4. He slammed 
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on the brakes short of the pole, backed up and again braked abruptly, and finally pulled up to 
the gas pump. R. 106: 4, 13. Defendant almost fell over backwards when he exited the 
driver's seat. R. 106: 5, 13-14. As he filled the truck with gas, defendant had to steady 
himself to remain upright. R. 106: 6. 
Meanwhile, defendant's friend entered the store and appeared to be "doing quite 
well." R. 106: 8. However, when he tried to purchase more alcohol, the store manager 
refused based on his observations of defendant at the gas pump. See R. 106:8. After filling 
the truck, defendant staggered into the store. See R. 106:5-6. His eyes were glazed over, his 
speech was 'Very slurred," and a "strong" odor of alcohol emanated from his person. R. 106: 
6, 18.1 After observing defendant's inability to adequately maintain his balance and his 
glazed-over eyes, the manager concluded that defendant had in fact "had too much to drink" 
and that he was "obviously way past anything reasonable." R. 106: 5, 8,14. At that point, 
the manager telephoned police. R. 106: 9-10. 
Once in the store, defendant began arguing with his friend over how much each should 
pay for the gas. R. 106: 5. Over the next several minutes, the argument escalated and 
defendant threatened to kill his friend. R. 106:14. Because officers had still not responded, 
the manager placed a second call to police. R. 106:9-10. Police arrived a few minutes later. 
R. 106:10. On observing defendant, San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacey also concluded 
1
 The store manager testified that he could not smell things very well and thus could 
not smell any odor of alcohol coming from defendant. R. 106: 7. However, Sheriff Mike 
Lacy testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol from defendant's person. R. 106: 18. 
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that defendant was "very intoxicated." R. 106: 17. SheriffLacey observed that defendant 
had difficulty exiting another officer's vehicle and that he was very unsteady on his feet, 
nearly falling down a couple of times. R. 106: 17-18. Defendant was very boisterous, still 
complaining about his friend and declaring that he was going to kill him. R. 106:18. Sheriff 
Lacey also noticed that defendant's speech was very slurred and that a strong odor of alcohol 
emanated from his person. R. 106: 17-18. After arriving at the police station, defendant 
refused to submit to a breathalyzer. R. 106:19,22. Defendant had been convicted of driving 
under the influence twice before. R. 106: 24. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 11 Compliance. The trial court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The plea affidavit of defendant, which incorporated the Information, 
adequately explained the nature and elements of the offense to which defendant pled guilty. 
The affidavit also set forth an adequate factual basis for the plea. That factual basis was 
augmented by the transcript of the preliminary hearing where the same judge who took the 
plea resided. 
Plea Agreement. In accordance with the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended 
that defendant serve 90 days in the county jail, to be served concurrently with a sentence 
defendant was presently serving. Defendant received the benefit of the bargain and thus was 
not entitled to the withdrawal of his plea. The prosecutor's subsequent recommendation to 
the Board of Pardons, which was not contemplated under the agreement, did not constitute a 
breach of the agreement. If appropriate, the court may remand the case with instructions that 
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the prosecutor file an amended report with the Board explaining more fully the plea 
agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
for two reasons* First, he contends that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it did not establish that defendant understood the 
nature and elements of the offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea. Aplt. Brf. 
at 10-17. Second, defendant contends that the prosecutor did not fulfill his obligation under 
the plea agreement. Aplt Brf. at 17-24. Both grounds lack merit 
A. THE TRIAL, COURT STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that before accepting a guilty 
plea, the trial court must make a number of findings relating to a defendant's rights and the 
consequences of pleading guilty. Trial courts must strictly comply with rule 11, '"personally 
establishing] that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
establishing] on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights.'" State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11,22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
993, 995 (Utah 1993)). 
The trial court's rule 11 findings "may be based on questioning of the defendant on 
the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
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that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn 
statement." Utah R. Crim. P. (e)(8). Rule 11 findings may also be based on other record 
factors, including "the contents of other documents such as the information, presentence 
reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on." State v. Maguire, 
830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991); accord Visser, 2000 UT 88, at f 12. "[Sjtrict compliance 
can [thus] be accomplished by multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is 
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled." Maguire, 
830 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2000). R. 33-34; R. 108:7. Section 
41-6-44 provides: 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within 
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; 
or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
* * * 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) & (6)(a) (Supp. 2000). To satisfy rule 11 requirements, 
defendant submitted a sworn statement setting forth his rights and acknowledging that he 
understood he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. See R. 33-40 (Addendum A). 
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Before accepting defendant's guilty plea, the court established that defendant had read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. See R. 108: 6-7. After doing 
so, the court fulfilled the requirements of rule 11, finding that "defendant [was] aware of his 
legal and constitutional rights [under rule 11] and that he [ ] knowingly and voluntarily 
waived those rights." R. 108: 7. The trial court then "orderfed] that the plea be entered." 
R. 108: 7. 
1. Defendant Understood the Nature and Elements of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol. 
Defendant argues that the plea affidavit inaccurately identified the nature and elements 
of the crime to which he pled guilty. Aplt Brf. at 10-17. At issue, therefore, is the rule 11 
requirement that the court find that: 
the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements 
Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(e)(4XA). Defendant claims that the affidavit only referenced the legal 
limit alternative of the DUI statute. Aplt Brf. at 15. He reasons that because he refused to 
submit to a chemical test, he could not be convicted of driving with a breath alcohol 
concentration (BAC) of .08 or greater, but only of driving while illegally impaired. Aplt. 
Brf. at 16. He thus argues that the record "did not adequately establish that [he] understood 
the elements of the offense that the government would have to show." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. 
Defendant's claim is rebutted by the record. 
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On page 2 of the sworn statement, defendant acknowledged his understanding of the 
nature and elements of the offense as follows: 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have 
read it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of 
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) 
are: 
Actual physical control of a vehicle 
w/ BAC of. 08 or greater w/ 2 or 
more prior DUVs w/i 6 years 
R. 34 (emphasized lines hand-written). Defendant focuses only on the hand-written portion 
of the statement, ignoring the initial paragraph which incorporates the Information. In that 
paragraph, defendant acknowledges that he "received a copy of the (Amended) Information" 
and that he had "read it, or had it read to [him], and [that he] understood] the nature and 
elements of [the] crime(s) to which [he was] pleading guilty." See R. 34. "[I]t is clear 
[therefore,] that [the Information was] indeed part of the defendant's knowledge and 
understanding." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218 n.2. The Information set forth the elements of 
both DUI alternatives: 
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL 
AND/OR DRUGS (WITH PRIORS), in violation of §41-6-44, a third 
degree felony, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the defendant did 
operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and 
(i) had sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two 
hours of the alleged operation or physical control showed that the defendant 
had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; or 
(ii) was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle; 
and the defendant has at least two or more prior convictions under Utah 
Code § 41-6-44 within six years of this violation. 
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R. 1 (Addendum B). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the record contains a satisfactory 
basis for the court's finding that defendant understood the nature and elements of the crime to 
which he pled guilty, including the impairment alternative. As noted in Visser, "[s]trict 
compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights enumerated by 
rule 11." 2000 UT 88, at % 13. Where, as here, the plea affidavit expressly refers to the 
elements as set forth in the Information, the trial court's reliance thereon satisfies rule 11. 
See id. at f 12 (holding that strict compliance can be accomplished by reference to "the 
contents of other documents such as the information")-
Even assuming that the affidavit only referred to the chemical test alternative of the 
DUI statute, it would still satisfy the rule 11 requirement that defendant understand the nature 
and elements of the offense. Section 41-6-44 is a single offense which may be proved either 
by showing that the driver had a BAC of .08 grams or greater or by showing that the driver 
was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. The statute thus equates the concepts of BAC limits and alcohol 
impairment "as alternative ways of establishing the actus reus of a single crime." See State 
v. Bratthauer, 354 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 1984) (holding trial court not required to give 
instruction requiring jury unanimity on the alternative means for committing DUI); see also 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314,1319 (Utah 1983) (holding that alcohol limit "gives rise 
to a conclusive presumption of being under the influence"). Because the two alternatives are 
conceptually identical, the plea affidavit adequately informed defendant of the nature and 
elements of the crime to which he pled. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). In short, 
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defendant's claim that the affidavit was inadequate is unavailing because the affidavit's 
reference to the legal limit "d[id] not distort the nature of [defendant's] criminal conduct or 
create a false impression concerning that conduct." Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1038 
(Utah 1989).2 
2. A Factual Basis Exists for Defendant's Guilty Plea. 
Defendant also argues that his Statement provided no factual basis for the plea. Aplt. 
Brf. at 15-17. "In order to satisfy the factual basis requirement, 'the record must reveal either 
facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a 
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial.'" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 
186,1 13, 5 P.3d 1222 (quoting State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah App. 1993)); 
accord Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). This requirement was satisfied here. 
In his sworn statement, defendant stated: 
I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute 
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for 
the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of 
the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
/ was driving my car 
I had been drinking 
I have two prior DUI's w/i 
last 6 years 
2
 In Hurst, the trial court permitted defendant to plead guilty to a crime he factually 
did not commit—aggravated sexual abuse of a child—to avert the risk of conviction for the 
crimes with which he was charged—sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child. 777 P.2d 
at 1038. The Supreme Court upheld the guilty plea on the ground that the crime to which 
defendant pled was "of the same genre of crimes" as those charged leaving no risk that the 
conviction distorted the nature of defendant's conduct. 
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R. 34 (emphasized lines hand-written). Although defendant asserts that the foregoing factual 
basis was inadequate, he does not explain why. In his statement, defendant admits that he 
was driving his car, that he had been drinking, and that he had two prior DUI convictions 
within the previous six years. The affidavit did not identify the beverage defendant had been 
drinking. However, "drinking" is universally used in reference to the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. Given the term's universal meaning, as well as the context in which the 
statement was given, the trial court could with confidence infer that the statement was an 
admission that defendant had been drinking alcohol. Moreover, use of the phrase "I had been 
drinking" implies that defendant's consumption was not limited to a single drink, but 
involved multiple drinks. The factual basis provided in the affidavit, therefore, "established] 
that the charged crime [of DUI] was actually committed by the defendant," or, at the very 
least, that "the prosecution ha[d] sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction," Utah R. Crim, P, 1 l(e)(4XB). That is all that is required. 
Moreover, the record considered to determine the factual basis for defendant's guilty 
plea "consists of the entire record before [the Court] on appeal, which includes all portions of 
the trial court record certified on appeal." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 674 (Utah App. 
1993). Accordingly, this Court may properly consider the transcript of defendant's 
preliminary hearing. See Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Utah 1992) (reviewing 
preliminary hearing transcript to determine whether there was factual basis for plea). 
At that hearing, which was presided over by the same judge who took defendant's 
plea, the evidence demonstrated that defendant and a friend purchased a case of beer at a gas 
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station and returned some two hours later to purchase more. R. 106:4,8. Defendant drove 
into the gas station "jerking and lurching, and stomping on the brake." R. 106:4. He almost 
fell over backwards when he exited the driver's seat and he staggered into the station after 
filling his truck with gas. R. 106: 5-6, 13-14. Defendant was very boisterous and his eyes 
were glazed over, his speech was "very slurred," and a "strong" odor of alcohol emanated 
from his person. R. 106: 5-6,14,18. The station manager assessed that defendant was "way 
past anything reasonable" in terms of his faculties and the sheriff agreed, concluding that he 
was "very intoxicated." R. 106: 5, 8, 14, 17-18. Moreover, when defendant was asked to 
submit to a breath test, he refused. R. 106: 19, 22. These facts provided more than a 
sufficient basis for the plea. 
* * * 
In summary, the record demonstrates that defendant understood the nature and 
elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. The record also demonstrates that a factual 
basis existed for the guilty plea. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that "defendant 
[was] aware of his legal and constitutional rights and that he [had] knowingly and voluntarily 
waived those rights." R. 108: 7. 
B, THE PROSECUTOR FULFILLED THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor's report to the 
Board of Pardons did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. Aplt. Brf. at 17-24. In 
its ruling, the trial court determined that the plea agreement concerned "the prosecutor's 
recommendation to the court on what the sentence would be, not recommendations, if any, to 
13 
the board of pardons on the length of a prison sentence." R. 100-01 (Addendum C). 
Defendant's challenge to the ruling fails. 
1. The Plea Agreement, the Sentencing Recommendation, and the Report 
to the Board of Pardons. 
Plea Agreement. At the plea hearing, counsel for defendant informed the court that in 
exchange for defendant's plea, the State "agreed to recommend that [defendant] only serve 
90 days in the [ ] San Juan County Jail," to be served concurrently with a jail sentence he was 
presently serving in Blanding. R. 108:4-5. After accepting the guilty plea, the court asked 
the prosecutor if he wanted the matter referred to Adult Probation & Parole (AP & P) for a 
presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 108:7. The prosecutor responded in the negative, 
indicating that his "recommendation is going to be the same." R. 108: 7. The court 
nevertheless ordered preparation of a PSI and set a sentencing date. R. 108: 7, 9. 
Presentence Investigation Report. The PSI recommended that defendant be sentenced 
to prison for an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years. PSI at 13-14. The recommendation 
was based on defendant's extensive criminal history, which revealed eight DUI convictions 
and four assault convictions of varying degrees, and AP & Fs assessment that defendant 
would not be a good candidate for rehabilitation while on probation. See PSI at 4-7. 
Sentencing. At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to deviate from the 
recommendation of AP & P and "follow the recommendation of the state for ninety days 
[with] credit [for] the time served; and that he be allowed to finish his parole from New 
Mexico and be placed on probation in the state of Utah." R. 107: 9. The prosecutor replied: 
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. . . [Defense counsel] is correct. The reason why we agreed to recommend the 
ninety days is because he had done a year in Farmington, New Mexico after he 
had gotten the DUI here, so that's the recommendation I promised to give, and 
that's the recommendation I'm giving. 
R. 107: 9. Thus, true to the State's plea agreement, the prosecutor made the agreed 
recommendation. R. 107:9. Notwithstanding that recommendation, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 107: 10. 
Report to Board of Pardons. After defendant's sentencing, the prosecutor submitted 
his report to the Board of Pardons as required under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (1999). 
R. 85-86. In that report, the prosecutor expressed his belief that defendant represented a 
"severe and real risk to anyone on the highways in the state of Utah and to himself and that 
defendant should serve 2Vi years of his prison term. R. 86 (Addendum D). 
2. The Prosecutor Did Not Breach the Plea Agreement. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor violated the terms of the plea agreement when he 
recommended to the Board of Pardons that defendant serve 2*/2 years of his prison term. 
Aplt. Brf. at 21-24. A plea bargain creates a contractual relationship between the State and 
the defendant, subject, of course, to constitutional restraints. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 
387 (Utah App. 1997). Accordingly, "a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a 
guilty plea and then refuse to keep those promises." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1275 
(Utah 1988). If the prosecutor breaches the plea agreement, the remedy for the defendant "is 
frequently specific performance." State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988). Under 
some circumstances, a defendant may be allowed to withdraw his plea if the prosecutor 
breached the plea agreement. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, f 9, 57 P.3d 238. 
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Defendant argues that the prosecutor's report to the Board of Pardons was a breach of 
his agreement to make a sentencing recommendation of 90 days in jail to be served 
concurrently with his Blanding sentence. Aplt. Brf. at 23. In interpreting a contractual 
agreement, this Court "first lookjs] to the four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intent of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. BlomquisU 112> P.2d 1382, 
1385 (Utah 1989). Review of the plea agreement demonstrates that the promise of the 
prosecution was limited to a sentencing recommendation to the trial court. As expressed by 
the parties at the change of plea hearing, in the sworn statement of defendant, and at the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that defendant serve 90 days in the 
San Juan County Jail, that it be served concurrently with the sentence he was presently 
serving in Blanding, and that defendant be placed on probation in Utah. R. 37; R. 107:7-9; 
R. 108:4-6. These are all matters to be determined by the trial court at sentencing. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(c) (providing that "[u]pon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall impose sentence"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1999) (providing that a court 
may sentence a person to pay a fine, to probation, to imprisonment, etc.); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(1) (providing that "court shall determine . . . whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (8)(v) (1999) (providing that court may 
require defendant to serve up to one year in jail as a condition of probation). The record 
establishes that the prosecutor made the agreed recommendation at the sentencing hearing, 
see R. 107: 9, and defendant has not argued otherwise on appeal. Aplt. Brf. at 21-24. 
16 
Defendant contends, however, that the Board of Pardons is the "ultimate sentencing 
authority" and that the prosecutor's recommendation to the Board thus constituted a 
"sentencing recommendation" contrary to the terms of the plea agreement. Aplt. Brf. at 23-
24. The Board, however, does not impose sentence, but determines the date of a defendant's 
release after the sentence has been imposed. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-7 (1999); see also 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985). Although the Board's power to 
determine the actual time a defendant will serve is "a power analogous to that of a court to 
actually impose a sentence," Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994), it 
nevertheless falls short of actual sentencing authority to decide whether probation will be 
granted, whether prison will be imposed, or whether the term will be served concurrently or 
consecutively with other sentences. 
In this case, defendant decided to plead guilty after securing the prosecutor's promise 
to recommend that the court sentence him to a 90-day jail term as a condition of probation, to 
be served concurrently with a sentence he was presently serving in Blanding. See R. 37; 
R. 107: 7-9; R. 108: 4-6. In other words, the inducement to plead guilty was a favorable 
sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor in the hope that the court would impose 
probation rather than prison. Defendant nevertheless understood that probation was subject 
to the will of the court. After the terms of the plea agreement were explained to the court and 
before the plea was accepted, the court expressly advised defendant that it did "not have to 
follow any sentencing recommendation the prosecutor may have agreed to make and [could] 
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impose the maximum sentence of up to five years in prison." R. 108: 6. Defendant 
confirmed that he understood and pled guilty. R. 108: 6-7. 
As promised, the prosecutor made the favorable recommendation at sentencing. See 
R. 107: 9. At that point, the inducement or consideration for the guilty plea had been 
fulfilled—a favorable sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor. Defendant was then 
left to hope that the court would deviate from the PSI report and instead follow the favorable 
recommendation of the prosecutor. In short, defendant received the benefit of the bargain. 
The bargain having been fulfilled, the prosecutor's actions after sentencing could not 
constitute a breach of the agreement. "Where a defendant is aware there is no guarantee the 
court will agree to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor," as was the case here, 
"there is no reason to set aside a plea of guilty." State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129,131 (Utah 
1976).3 
As noted by defendant, the prosecutor's report to the Board of Pardons is mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (1999). And although section 77-27-13 does not specifically 
ask for a recommendation from the prosecutor as part of that report, neither does it forbid it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5). Indeed, the statute's provision that the report include 
"any other information the prosecutor believes will be relevant to the board" fairly 
3
 Moreover, had the prosecutor promised to make a similar recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons, that promise would have been illusory since the Board was powerless to 
order that the time be served in jail, that it be served concurrently with another sentence, or 
that defendant be placed on probation. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1275 (holding that a 
promise to make a recommendation which court cannot follow is illusory and misleading). 
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contemplates the inclusion of a prosecutor's belief regarding the appropriate term of actual 
incarceration given the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation and his risk to society. 
Defendant does correctly point out that the report to the Board of Pardons must 
include "a written record of any plea bargain entered into." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) 
(1999). Although the report indicated that defendant had pled guilty to the third degree 
felony DUI charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two charges, it did not advise 
the Board of the prosecutor's promise to make a sentencing recommendation. See R. 85. 
The record does not show whether the Board was in fact made aware, through other sources, 
of that element of the plea bargain. If it was not, this Court may remand the case for the 
limited purpose of having the prosecutor submit an amended report to the Board of Pardons 
more folly explaining the plea agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction, and if appropriate, remand the case for the limited purpose of 
requiring the prosecutor to file an amended report with the Board of Pardons more folly 
explaining the terms of the plea agreement. 
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Respectfully submitted this O day of February, 2003 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
iY S. GRAY ~^< 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2003,1 served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Edwin Birdhand Lehi, by causing 
them to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record, as follows: 
Kristine M. Rogers 
712 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jeffifc^S. Gray 
distant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Addendum \ 
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IN THE Sr .y^U? JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT L 
S".V/ W ^ W COUNTY, STATE 9F UTAH hx 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
<f/XvW l£*-f/ 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 
I. fr^vW l f * f / , hereby acknowledge and certify that i have been. 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (orsegBBst) to the following crimes: 
B. 
C. 
D. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
On t J ;A/(S- u*/-v$*a JZCL 
Degree 
V N. ty 
Punishment 
Miu/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
0 S Si* <>& A~A 
aS c7o Son <L*^ 
fLi
^T>ru ri<y~^ t-
Oi/*JASZZf,AXr 
b% W A 
^ - ? 
i 
8 / 2 7 / O L 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or aiafetest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
flttW hH^iui <W>u/ (4 4 Uti^ 
V N\L vf .eft 01 b+vWL- t~/ Zdn, 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above^Qr.Jf I am pladiaruu cuutest. I am norcontesting that I committed the 
fofegoing~aintte). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(oi ue etatest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(o.mufiflfltest): 
<0&*/V<£.(A> 
Liy/\ \j> M \*p*t. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
2 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (fisv€) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is n ' l '^H s ^ ik 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty, 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
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each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that By pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution mat may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me, If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
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Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
Sr^TT it/iii /lsss->~\^*«0 . 
9, J. c*^ Uj 
Cij^r)^^^o A), si /J/K^? 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
1 have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my .plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am do.ng 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)v I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been 
sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days 
for any reason. 
Dated this / bndav of Ly/ , 
"t . 2 0 ^ . 
^EFENDANT " ' 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this nU day of , Yltl^jgjfU 
ludge 
fotary Public 
Residing at 
My commission expires 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for .the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she/ has read the statement or that I have read it to 
him/her, I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my 
knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crimes(s) 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and 
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
4/ 7 
ATTORNEY FpR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. J ^O^.r, 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
_, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest ^ . 
^^H/^K 
PkOSECUTtNGATTOIWEY 
Bar No. 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this l 2 $ u day of l/ilnM^f, , l&Zr 
CT COURT JUDGE 
Addendum B 
\ddendum B 
Craig C. Halls #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone:(435) 587-2128 ext. 118 
Fax:(435)587-3119 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI 
BOX 1075 
BLANDJMx,UT84511 
DOB:-08/35/2000 - ioftl^ 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
CASE NO. 6057^ 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
OTN#: 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: MIKE LACY AND 
ALAN FREESTONE 
The undersigned Craig Halls, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, in San Juan County, State of Utah, committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (WITH 
PRIORS), in violation of §41-6-44, a third degree felony, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, 
the defendant did operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and 
(i) had sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two hours of the alleged 
operation or physical control showed that the defendant had a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater, or 
(ii) was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle; 
and the defendant has at least two or more prior convictions under Utah Code § 41-6-44 within 
six years of this violation. 
COUNT 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATORS LICENSE, in 
violation of §53-3-227(3)(a), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the 
defendant did operate a motor vehicle while his/her operator's license was denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked for (ii) violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44; 
^EvyPNTH f 
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COUNT 3: NO REGISTRATION, in violation of §41-1 a-1303(1), a class C misdemeanor, as 
follows: That on or about 8-25-2000, the defendant did drive or move upon any highway a 
vehicle of a type required to be registered in this state 
(a) that is not registered or for which a certificate of title has not been issued or applied for; or 
(b) for which the required fee has not been paid.. 
Authorized 25 August 2000 
for presentment and filing: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County"Attorney 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FILEl> J U L 1 8 2002 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County 
State Of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 0017-85 
Defendant, for the third time, has moved the court to permit 
him to withdraw his guilty plea. This time he adds a claim that 
the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by recommending after 
sentencing, that his incarceration be for at least two years and a 
half. 
The court does not agree that an agreement to recommend a 
particular sentence binds the prosecutor not to comment to the 
board of pardons after sentence is imposed. The agreement deals 
with the prosecutor's recommendation to the court on what the 
sentence would be, not recommendations, if any, to the board of 
pardons on the length of a prison sentence. 
Though this case does not require this court to reach the 
question, this court disagrees that a defendant should always be 
permitted to withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecutor fails to 
follow through on every aspect of a plea bargain. Sometimes the 
plea bargain does not foresee every eventuality and does not 
expressly provide what the prosecutor may and may not do. In that 
circumstance, it seems unfair to impose such a drastic remedy if 
the prosecutor guesses wrong, especially since the prosecutor has 
no right to undo a plea bargain if the defendant fails to comply.1 
DATED this M/L\ day of July, 2002. 
1
 Consider, for example, a nvurderer who pleads to simple 
murder instead of aggravated murder on the condition that he 
reveal all of his criminal conduct, including forgeries of 
historic writings. If he fails to reveal the truth, he still 
cannot be prosecuted for aggravated murder. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the f C> day of July, 2002, I 
mailed/hand delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
RULING to the following: 
Craig Halls 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Happy Morgan 
Attorney at Law 
8 South 100 East 
Moab, UT 84532 
%$fcu^ 
Deputy Clark 
Addendum D 
Addendum D 
CRAIG C. BALLS 
San Jama County Attorney 
p. 0. Box 850 
Montieallo, Utah 84535 
Phone 435-587-2128 
Fax No. 435-587-3119 
HI TBS SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IH AHD TOR SAN JUAM COUNTY, STATE 07 UTAH 
STATS 07 UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * PROSSCUfOR'S 
REPORT TO 
vs. * BOARD 07 PARDONS 
BDNXH BURTHAND LBBT, * Criminal Be. 0017-85 
Defendant(e). * 
in accordance- with Section 77-27-13 (5), the following 
information is respectfully submitted to the Board of Pardonst 
DBSCRI7TX0H 07 TBS CRIXi 
Mr. Lehi was originally charged on a 3 count Information. 
Count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a Third 
Degree Felony based upon his prior history. Count 2* Driving on a 
Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
count 3: Ho Registration, a Class C Misdemeanor. 
PLHA BARGAINING 
Defendant pled to Count 1. Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed. 
MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMBTAHCSS 
This office feels that they are all aggravating circumstances 
in this case. The aggravating circumstances involved in this case 
include the severity of the previous criminal history and that can 
be observed'..in the Pre-Sentence investigative Report which 
indicate* four mad a bmlt page* of alcohol and violen&behavior. 
By. thai nature.of his prior incarceration history, Mr&Lehi is 
currently on parole from the state of New Mexico % having'spent 1. 
year in. jail in Hew Mexico for a DUI that oecuzxedrbetwetfn the time 
that this DUX occurred and the time that ha vae^senteneed for this 
DUIv'. Mr 4 Lehi spent lyear in the Hew >l*xico~ pri«on before he 
could-J* iibrought?- back*; to the state of*m*an«£for-purpbaa.<,of-
sentencing;on? this conviction. 
Mr:1-Lehi4 has a severe, alcohol problem and the*,recommendation 
in this Prosecutor's Report is based somewhat on the protection of 
the community froa Mr. Lehi 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
The original DUX report and the Pre-sentencing Investigative 
Report are included in this packet• 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
There are no victims or restitution involved in this DUX. 
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION 
Because of the defendants extensive prior record, it is my 
belief that Mr. Lehi will not be rehabilitated in an in-patient 
alcohol program or in counseling* I believe that he is a severe 
and real risk to anyone on the highways in the state of Utah and to 
himself # I believe that- he should be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for a significant amount of time and on these charges I 
believe ought to be for 2 1/2 years• 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2002. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Report to the Board of 
Pardons to: The State of Utah, Board of Pardons, at 448 Bast 6400 
South, Suite 300, Mnrray,Utah 84107 this 5th day of February 2002, 
by placing sane postage prepaid in the Mo^ceUtTYbst Office. 
s~~tt%±m Robinson 
